This article contributes to the literature on industry architecture by identifying the conditions that enable the emergence of architectural advantage. To understand how one firm can shape the industry architecture in its favor, we analyzed a historical case study on the role of Lew Wasserman and the Music Corporation of America (MCA) in the evolution of the motion picture industry in the United States. We focused on two major disruptive events: the 1948 Paramount Decree which forced vertically integrated movie studios to divest their theaters, and the explosion of television as a new form of entertainment in the 1950s which became an alternative for exhibiting movies. In both these cases, one company, MCA, managed to improve substantially its standing by occupying and consolidating a position of advantage in the industry or, in other terms, an 'architectural advantage'. We show how in both cases this was the result of interactions between the Studios, constrained by the institutional logic of the industry, the regulatory framework, and MCA's introduction of novel practices. The latter consolidated its grip on talents and facilitated the growth of independent production and TV production.
Introduction

I
n addressing the critical question of industry evolution, three research traditions, industrial organization (Bain, 1968; Porter, 1980; Gort and Klepper, 1982; McGahan, 2004) , institutional and evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Teece, 1986; Langlois and Robertson, 1995; Jacobides, 2005) , and institutional theory (Haveman and Rao, 1997; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; Lounsbury, 2007) , have helped us understand antecedents and consequences of structural changes in industries. Nevertheless, most studies in these traditions did not specify how the 'rules and roles' that shape division of labor in the industry emerge and change.
The concept of 'industry architecture' (Jacobides et al., 2006) provides a useful conceptual tool to explore the role of technical and institutional forces in shaping the division of labor in the industry and the related distribution of value. The process through which firms can achieve an architectural advantage is a fertile ground for empirical and theoretical work, given that much existing research has focused on the consequences of exogenous shocks (for instance, technical innovation or regulatory change). Such a focus obscures the mechanisms that guide the emergence of novel industry structure in the wake of a shock as well as the role that incumbents' actions play. The article is organized as follows. First, we provide a short overview of the relevant academic literature on industry evolution and architecture. Then, after describing the methods and our data sources, we delve into the rich historical narrative of the evolving motion picture industry in the United States and of MCA's rise to power and industry dominance. In the last section, we interpret our findings, outlining the contour of our contribution and discussing its managerial and policy implications.
Theoretical background
Economists, sociologists and strategic management scholars have explored industry evolution from different perspectives, and provided interesting insights on this process. In economics the Industrial Organization tradition (Bain, 1968; Porter, 1980) mainly focused on the structural and technical features of industries as determinants of their participants' profitability. In this tradition scholars have shown how exogenous factors such as the number of potential entrants, the growth rate of incumbent firms, and the ease of imitation of incumbent firms will influence the structure of the industry (Gort and Klepper, 1982; Klepper and Graddy, 1990 ) and how technological innovation affects industry concentration (Geroski and Pomroy, 1990) . More recently scholars have developed fully endogenous models of industry evolution (Klepper, 1996 (Klepper, , 2002 but despite the acknowledgement that firms could and should attempt to influence the structure of their industries, this research tradition has not explored how changes in the rules of the game can transform competitive dynamics in the industry, and lead to the emergence of entirely new industries. Furthermore, it has not provided much theoretical insight on how to do so (see Geroski (2003) and McGahan (2004) for an exception). In the evolutionary economics tradition (Nelson and Winter, 1982) , technological change can have dramatic impact on the development of industry structure and provides a necessary causal link in the co-evolution of firms and industry (Murmann, 2003) . Malerba et al. (2008) suggest that a key factor in explaining changes in the vertical scope of firms is the process of accumulating capabilities at the firm and industry levels. Another example of interactions between firm-level processes and industry-level dynamics is given by Feldman and Romanelli (2006) , who studied biotechnology regional clusters in the United States between 1976 and 2002. They showed that the key factor driving the growth of these clusters was the proportion of firms founded by former employees of established biotherapeutics firms (breakaway firms). Despite their important contributions, these studies do not explain how the division of labor in the industry changes, the consequences of these changes, and the role that firms play in the process.
In recent years these questions have been the focus of much empirical and theoretical work, especially focused on the analysis of vertical scope, which helped us understand how industry boundaries evolve, and how intermediate markets emerge. Jacobides (2005) provides a framework for explaining the nature and drivers of vertical disintegration in the US mortgage banking industry. This study suggests that gains from specialization and gains from trade shape the processes leading to the conditions necessary for market emergence: coordination simplification, and information standardization. In a study of the British building industry, Cacciatori and Jacobides (2005) found that the vertical division of labor affected the knowledge base of each segment of the industry, and established the trajectories for capability development. These studies help us better characterize the co-evolution of industry boundaries and firm capabilities (Jacobides and Winter, 2005) and clearly state that industry participants are actively trying to change the industry: 'exogenous factors did not shape this value chain, but rather, the conscious, even if occasionally myopic, efforts of industry participants and potential entrants shaped it' (Jacobides, 2005: 490) . Nevertheless, these studies were narrowly focused on the issue of scope identification, and the question of how novel rules of the game emerge in an industry was not central to their efforts.
From a sociological perspective, institutional theory might help us better understand where industry rules and roles come from, by shifting our focus towards a new unit of analysis: organizational fields. It also introduced the concept of institutional logics (Friedland and Alford, 1991) : the rules of the game that industry players follow and takefor-granted, and the cultural and institutional antecedents of such rules (Hirsch and Lounsbury, 1997; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999) . DiMaggio and Powell (1983) define an organizational field as 'those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products ' (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 148) . This shift in the unit of analysis goes beyond the traditional industry boundaries employed by both economists and population ecologists (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) . The shift also helped researchers focus on the role of actors so far neglected, such as regulators (Schneiberg and Soule, 2005) ; social movements (Rao, 1998; Lounsbury et al., 2003; King and Soule, 2007; Sine and Lee, 2009) ; professions (Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007) ; and local communities (Marquis and Battilana, forthcoming) . While most early work in this literature emphasized the consequences of institutional changes, but did not provide much opportunity for agency, this initial bias has been challenged by organizational theorists. Employing the concept of institutional entrepreneurship (DiMaggio, 1991) , some researchers emphasized the need for a triggering event that leads to change (Greenwood et al., 2002; Sine and David, 2003) . Variously referred to as 'shocks' (Fligstein, 1991) or 'jolts' (Meyer, 1982) , such unsettling events create disruptive uncertainty for individual organizations, forcing some to initiate unconventional experiments upon established practice.
Focusing on a broader set of actors than just competitors has helped researchers better understand the process of industry emergence. For instance, in the case of biotechnology, researchers have documented the shifting evolution of collaborative activities among university, entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and government agencies and how these networks shaped the opportunity structure of the field . Kaplan and Murray (forthcoming) trace the development of biotechnology in human therapeutics over a 30-year period . They show how it has
evolved toward the current dominant logic after a long period of struggle between different actors: dedicated biotech firms, large pharmaceutical firms, courts, congress, government agencies, universities, and scientists. Grodal (2007) explored the co-evolution of labels, meaning and resources in the emergence of the nanotechnology field, and concluded that entrepreneurs and scientists did not play a central role in the emerging nanotechnology label. Instead it was influenced primarily by futurists, government officials, venture capitalists, and IP lawyers. These macro insights on how industry logics emerge and change speak more to industrial organization (Klepper, 1996) and ecological (Hannan et al., 1995) models of industry evolution than to strategic management's theories of competitive advantage (Porter, 1980; Teece, 1986) . In the latter perspective, it is critical to go beyond the economics of the industry, and understand how institutional logic affects the economics of individual firms.
Steeped in the tradition of evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982) , the concept of industry architecture might help us bridge the economic and institutional approaches because it considers technological, economic, and institutional factors. An industry architecture consists of (1) a template defining how labor is divided (and value created) in the industry -who does what; and (2) a template defining value appropriation and division of surplus -who gets what (Jacobides et al., 2006) . A system of interfaces among firms emerges as these architectures become stable. These interfaces are 'technological, institutional, or social artifacts that allow two or more independent entities to divide labor' (Jacobides et al., 2006 (Jacobides et al., : 1203 . When these interfaces change, as happens with technological and regulatory changes, there is opportunity to renegotiate the architectures. Industry architecture, therefore, both constrains the action of competitors by defining rules for competition (formal and informal) and roles for interactions, and provides opportunity for entrepreneurial players to build a more favorable competitive position. Jacobides et al. (2006) suggest that firms can benefit from innovation by 'managing the industry's architecture carefully so they become the ''bottlenecks'' of the industry' (Jacobides et al., 2006 (Jacobides et al., : 1208 . While this concept might prove valuable in explaining not only the mechanisms of industry evolution, but also the process through which firms can build an architectural advantage, so far most work has been focused on how firms can benefit from technological innovation (Teece, 1986; Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006; Gawer and Henderson, 2007; Pisano and Teece, 2007) . The literature on platforms, for instance, has shown that firms can control entire ecosystems both by owning a core element of the technological system that defines its evolution, and by investing in complementary markets as Intel and Microsoft did in the PC ecosystem. In the case of Intel, the firm both committed to making money in the complementary markets it entered, signaling it would not drive down returns, but also actively gave away intellectual property to subsidize competitive entry. This latter action encouraged entrants to contribute to developing and widening the platform (Gawer and Henderson, 2007) . A small 'footprint' strategy might be used when products are modular, and a firm could leverage its knowledge of the product architecture to focus its activities on the modules that represent bottlenecks. This choice would result in a capital advantage, which could be leveraged to drive competitors' returns below their cost of capital (Baldwin and Clark, 2006) .
In this context the key insight, which extends and qualifies the framework developed by Teece (1986) , is that a firm might be better off by nurturing competition in complementary assets. This policy would facilitate entry in segments adjacent to the ones they occupy (and protect). Taken together, these articles provide a solid economic rationale for the existence of an architectural advantage, but they do not identify the mechanisms through which a firm can build one. Also, generalizing beyond the technology-driven industries studied in this literature, it is critical to specify what barriers, other than IP protection, might prevent competitors from imitating this strategy. We attempt to address the question of emerging architectural advantage by analyzing a historical case: the rise of Lew Wasserman and MCA in the Hollywood motion picture industry.
Research methods
Industry evolution and architectural change happen over long time periods, and to understand these changes, the researcher should employ historical methods (Pettigrew, 1992) . Historical methods are frequently used in strategy and organization theory research (Kieser, 1989; Rao, 1998; Hargadon and Douglas, 2001; Cacciatori and Jacobides, 2005) and widely accepted as a fruitful way to develop theory. Since this approach lets us examine multiple instances of institutional change over a long period of time, it can provide greater breadth of knowledge than participant observation or interviews (Rao, 1998: 921) . We used secondary data to identify sequences of actions and events and to examine how the sequences affect the industry's architecture.
The American motion picture industry is a good case for studying industry evolution because (a) the industry has gone through different architectures over the last century, and (b) these changes are well documented by historians of the industry in academic journal publications and books (Balio, 1976 (Balio, , 1985 Bordwell et al., 1985; Schatz, 1999) . Furthermore, anthropologists (Powdermaker, 1950) , economists (Storper, 1989; Chisholm, 1993 Chisholm, , 1997 , sociologists (Zuckerman et al., 2003; Sorenson and Waguespack, 2006; Cattani et al., 2008) , and strategy scholars (Enright, 1995; Miller and Shamsie, 1996; Mezias and Boyle, 2005) have provided useful insights into the industry's evolution and the operations of its productive system.
Historians of the movie industry commonly identify different stages (Gomery, 1986) precipitated by changes in the market, regulatory interventions like the 1948 Paramount Decree, or a series of technological innovations like television, cable TV, VHS, DVD, etc. In this article we are focusing on two of these exogenous shocks: the Paramount Decree and the diffusion of television. In addition to describing these changes in the industry as a whole, we will focus on the actions of the MCA: a newcomer to Hollywood in the 1940s that becomes one of the industry's most influential firms. In addition to the large wealth of material available on the history of this industry, recent publication
of in-depth biographies on MCA's President, Lew Wasserman, helped us track the evolution of MCA from the Talent Agency industry to the Motion Picture Industry. We employed a qualitative research strategy focusing on 'activities, choices and events' over time and identified who did what and when (Langley, 1999: 692) . Hence, we could develop a timeline of key events in the industry and map relationships among its players. We analyzed the data using Miles and Huberman's (1994) three steps of data reduction, data displays and interpretation and verification. The first data display captured Wasserman's career history, including work experience before becoming the CEO and his key relationships with other industry players. The second data display focused on the histories of the most relevant industry players, including MCA, their role in the value chain, and relationships with other companies. The third data display outlined key industry events and timelines such as law suits, court decisions, and key regulatory decisions. We relied on our immersion in the data and our contextual knowledge to assign meaning and draw conclusions from the data stream.
Building architectural advantage in the movie industry
The movie industry from its birth until the paramount decree Prior to 1915, the movie industry consisted of a large number of production companies that, for the most part, paid royalties to the trust that controlled all the crucial patents associated with moviemaking: the Motion Picture Parent Company (MPPC). Simultaneously, there were some smaller, independent production companies that operated outside the trust (Mezias and Kuperman, 2000; Jones, 2001; Mezias and Boyle, 2005) . In October 1915, a Federal Court found MPPC in violation of the Sherman Act, and by 1918 the trust was terminated. In the meanwhile feature-length films had become more popular than the short (one-reel) films usually produced by MPPC companies (Mezias and Boyle, 2005) , and movie theaters required steady supply of these longer films (Izod, 1988) . These factors, together with rising production costs of the conversion to sound, facilitated the emergence of nation-wide distribution companies and eventually the integration of production, distribution, and exhibition. From about 1915 to 1930 the industry was dominated by a small number of vertically integrated firms that provided production, distribution, and exhibition: the Hollywood Studio System (Schatz, 1988) . When the great depression struck, theater attendance decreased by more than 30%, forcing more than 4000 theaters to shut down over three years and thus increasing the concentration of ownership in exhibition. The production and distribution stages also became increasingly concentrated (Negro and Sorenson, 2005) . The major studios at that time were 20th Century Fox, Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer, Paramount, RKO, and Warner Bros and they controlled the majority of the market. The minors (Universal, Columbia, United Artists) owned no theater chains. Collectively, the majors controlled 3000 theatres of the 18,000 operating nationwide: 70% of first-run theatres in cities of more than 100,000 population and 60% of those in cities of 25,000-100,000 (Stuart, 1982) . The minors and other smaller players, which did not own theater chains, relied on deals with the majors to have their films exhibited. Their budgets (and profit margins) were lower and they generally borrowed stars from the majors since they could not afford to keep their own under contract. During the great depression theaters had started the practice of showing 'double features', charging one admission price for two movies. This practice was very successful and quickly became the norm of the industry until the 1940s. Nevertheless, theaters could not afford to show two top quality movies together and they needed cheaper productions. B movies, as these productions were called, were rented to the exhibitors for a flat fee, unlike A movies which were rented for a percentage of the boxoffice. Smaller movie producers (and some Minor Studios), which could not compete on high quality-high cost productions, focused their efforts on these B movies, which provided low but stable returns.
Before the rise of the studio system, many of the major stars had their own production companies, but by the 1930s most stars were salaried employees of the studios, typically under a 7-year contract. Talent agents marketed actors, directors, and writers and found employment offers for them. Their job was to negotiate deals between talents and studios on behalf of the talents. In the studio era, given the 7-year contract employment model, rather than securing their clients the best deals on a project-to-project basis, agents made money by luring stars to break contracts with their studios to re-sign them at other studios. They also re-negotiated salaries at certain review periods of contracts or following the escalating box-office success of their clients. Normally, agents were paid only if they found work for their clients and the payment took the form of a contractual commission of their clients' gross earnings (traditionally 10%). By the early 1930s, four agencies represented the majority of members in the Motion Picture Academy (Joyce-Selznick, Collier & Flynn, Edward Small, and Phil Berg). During the studio era agents primarily served star actors and key artists like directors and writers. Less important talents, such as minor actors, craftsmen, art directors, which would work more on a project basis, found little to no representation from talent agencies (Kemper, 2007) . The Screen Actors Guild (SAG), the main union representing actors, had long forbidden talent agencies from directly producing motion pictures, because of the innate conflict of interest in concurrently being the agent and the employer, but occasionally SAG would grant them the permission to produce a movie.
Studios controlled exhibition directly, given their dominant share of movie theaters, and indirectly, by contractually enforcing their conditions to independent theaters. With the exception of two relatively large theater circuits (Griffith and Schine), the ownership of independent theaters was highly fragmented. Given their limited bargaining power, independent theaters were forced, through the block-booking practice, to rent movies in bundles, sometimes without being able to see them in advance. Studios could bundle their best productions, the movies theaters (and audiences) really wanted, with many lower quality productions, and could therefore operate at full capacity (Schatz, 1999) . In sum, the Studio System operated according to an integrated logic, in which the Studios exerted direct control over production and distribution, and indirect control over creative talents and exhibition During World War II the Studio system experienced a period of strong growth in revenues and profitability: combined industry profits went up from $20 million in 1939 to over $60 million in 1945. During the war the number of movies produced was significantly reduced. Between 1937 and 1941, the Big Eight released 1833 feature films, while between 1942 and 1946 they released only 1395. Most of the cuts affected B-movie production, and therefore average production costs started to rise. Between 1942 and 1945, the average cost per movie grew from $336,600 to $554,386 (Table 1) . By 1945, the majors were concentrating almost exclusively on A-class production, while the minors focused more on B productions. After the war, movie attendance, which had peaked in 1946, went spiraling down, falling from $90 million admissions in 1948 to $70 million in 1949 and $60 million in 1950. Industry profits also fell from $119 million in 1946 to $50 million in 1950 ( Table 2) .
The Justice Department began an antitrust investigation into the industry's business practices in 1940; eight companies were named as defendants: the five majors and the three minors. The defendants were charged with anticompetitive dominance of the three major segments of the industry. Eventually, the Paramount decision in 1948 forced the separation of exhibition from production and distribution (Miller and Shamsie, 1996) . The court ordered the five majors to spin off their theater holdings, and it ordered the spun off circuits to divest one-quarter to one-half of their theaters. The prohibition against block booking 1 enabled the Minors (Universal, Columbia, United Artists) to capture a larger share of the production market. Moreover, on the exhibition level, divestiture weakened the buying power of the former affiliated circuits and the block-booking ban enabled independent exhibitors to gain more control of their operations. Since the studios could not control the production and exhibition at the same time, they reduced their output and dramatically cut back on the number of stars (Balio, 1985) . The combined effect of the Paramount decree and the decline in attendance (Caves, 2000) led major studios to decrease their production of feature films by more than 50%, adjust their cost structure, and concentrate more on distribution and film financing 2 (Christopherson and Storper, 1989 . 
Crawford, and many others. Other higher status agencies, incumbent players such as the Selznicks and William Morris, would not try to buy star's contracts: 'They felt they didn't need to, they were kings [y] it was beneath them', Wasserman said (Bruck, 2004: 73 To explain MCA's ability to grow so quickly and the limited reaction of competitors, it must be said that the agency business was not very profitable. Because the widespread 7-year contract industry practice tied artists to one of the studios for a very long time, agencies were of limited value to the talents. More established Hollywood agencies such as William Morris and Famous Artists Agency did not see acquisitions as an opportunity. For instance, William Morris, which had a strong position in Hollywood, was focused on other, more profitable businesses, such as talent for radio, vaudeville, clubs, and theater. Only after MCA had shown that, in post-Paramount decree Hollywood, representing movie talents could be truly profitable would William Morris start acquiring other agencies (Kemper, 2007) .
Why would the studios let agents control the talents that were so critical to their business? The combined effect of the Paramount decree, decreasing attendance, shrinking profits (Table 2) , production cuts, and rising production costs (Table 1 ) increasingly worried the studios about their 'stock' of talents and their ability to use them efficiently. As a consequence studios were now more than happy to let their talents go, opening up an opportunity for agents such as MCA. The number of actors under contract to major studios, which had been as high as 804 in 1944, fell first to 474 in 1949, and then to 164 by 1961. Similar declines are found for directors (99 in 1949 to 24 in 1959) , producers (from 149 to 50), and writers (from 91 to 47). Studios now had less control over talent, but in their attempt to keep production costs down, they became more aggressive in negotiating with them. This led to another opportunity for MCA. In 1950, Wasserman negotiated a deal for Jimmy Stewart in the Universal movie Winchester 73. At that time, Universal was in financial difficulty and could not afford Stewart's normal salary of $250,000. Instead, Stewart got no fixed salary but did get 50% of the net profits over the life of the film. The movie was a hit, and Stewart quickly became the richest actor in Hollywood. Profit-sharing contracts had been used sporadically before by Charles Feldman of Famous Artists Agency, but it is only through MCA that this practice diffused widely and became institutionalized. It helped MCA attract more Hollywood stars, lured by the potential of profit sharing, and cemented their relationship in the long term.
In addition to the diffusion of profit-sharing contracts, MCA also packaged the script, director, stars, and producer for several RKO pictures in late 1939 and early 1940. MCA had no control over the actual production, nor did it have any financial stake in the finished pictures. But packaging facilitated the shift in filmmaking authority, especially the initiation and development of movie projects, away from the studios and into hands of individual filmmakers (Schatz, 1999 Note that what opened the door to profit sharing and packaging was the need for the studios to reduce their risk exposure: as Mel Sattler, who negotiated the Winchester 73 contract on behalf of Universal, put it: 'Universal accepted the proposal because it permitted the company to put substantially less at risk by reducing its immediate production costs' (cited in Weinstein, 1998) . Both the agencies and the Studios were still operating under 'integrated logic' so agents were not particularly interested in growing a roster of talents that were not particularly profitable. Studios were just trying to reduce their production costs.
Another factor that helped MCA better leverage its investment in talents was the growth of independent production (Balio, 1976) . This growth was facilitated by the studios' decision to focus on distribution and financing, and leave production to independent production companies, often operating on their own lots. Robins (1993) , for instance, reports that Warner Bros distributed and financed, from 1946 to 1965, 207 independent and 162 studio productions. The consequences for this explosion in independent production, together with the increasing reliance on hits, created a more competitive market for acquiring top talent. The concentration of talents represented by MCA and the lock-in effect created by the profitsharing agreement that MCA helped diffuse, together with the rise of independent production, helped MCA consolidate its powerful position in the Hollywood of the 1950s.
Packaging and profit sharing became the building block of a novel industry architecture in which studios were now focused on the financing and distribution of pictures. Independent producers and occasionally talent agencies were producing pictures, often renting the studios' facilities, and talent agencies were much more central in the flow of exchanges, given their control of creative talents. This architecture is founded on a novel institutional logic stemming from the centrality of creative talents and independent production: 'talent logic'. The emergence of this new architecture was in response to the exogenous environmental shock: the Paramount decree and the studios' lost control of exhibition, as many have already noticed (Miller and Shamsie, 1996) . Nevertheless, this configuration of actors and activities was not a natural consequence of these shocks, but rather the emergent outcome of the interacting players. The introduction of two novel practices enabled the shifts in roles that players experienced, and later reinforced these new rules of the game. MCA played a critical part in this architectural shift by introducing the novel practices and, given its control of creative talents, reaped most of the benefits. In this sense, it is fair to say that MCA reshaped the industry's architecture to become the 'bottleneck'.
One episode in this story of the motion picture industry might not provide enough evidence on how these mechanisms operate. We will show how the same process can be observed in another key episode in the history of the same industry. In this case the exogenous shock is not of regulatory nature, but stems from the development of a novel form of movie exhibition: television.
The rise of television By 1950, 25% of American households owned a television set, and TV's penetration had doubled to 50% by 1952. From 1949 to 1953, cinema attendance decreased considerably and then stabilized at about 40 to 50 million admissions per week. Television was, in the view of the Studios, the main cause for this fall. However, motion picture producers believed that TV had inherent deficiencies as well. First of all, the smaller television image did not allow the audience to be as directly involved in the action as a large movie screen. Furthermore, the budget for television production was much smaller than the average production costs for motion pictures ($40,000 vs an average of $1 million; Table 1 ). Finally, TV production required a large amount of writing and acting talent: approximately 11,000 shows per year during prime evening hours alone compared to 400 pictures per year for the motion picture industry (Stuart, 1982) .
Nevertheless, the studios realized television could be a competitive threat and addressed it in different ways: first (1) they tried to control TV broadcasting, then (2) they invested to make the theater experience unique, and finally (3) they tried to starve TV by not providing them filmed content (see Table 3 for a summary of the actions taken by studios in reaction to television).
The largest movie studios (Warner Bros, Twentieth Century-Fox, and Paramount) initially tried to start building their own TV networks, but the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) blocked their efforts. As early as 1945, the FCC chairman Paul A. Porter addressed a meeting of industry leaders in Hollywood and warned them that the movie industry should not expect a significant role in television after the war (Anderson, 1999: 431) . There was also increasing negative public sentiment about movie studios, as depicted by an article in the February 1949 Consumer Report. It forecasted dire problems for the future of television should the studios, with their acknowledged record of monopolistic practices, find a foothold in television. Fuelled by this public sentiment, the FCC inquired into Hollywood anti-trust violations and blocked virtually every television initiative started by the motion picture industry (Hilmes, 1990) . In 1948, Warner Bros had plans to build its own networks by acquiring existing stations and had asked the FCC to approve the acquisition of Los Angeles TV Station KLAC. In interpreting the opportunities offered by the new technology, studio executives were bound by the traditional 'integrated logic'. This logic was based on direct control of distribution and exhibition and studios saw TV through this lens: an opportunity to get back what the Paramount decree had taken away. Therefore they 'were not satisfied merely to experiment in a medium controlled by the existing radio networks; they wanted to command the television industry just as they dominated the movie industry, by controlling the channels of distribution' (Anderson, 1999: 423) . The Communications Act of 1934 authorized the FCC to refuse station licenses to any corporation convicted of monopolistic practices, and therefore after the Paramount decree, the FCC was in a position to deny the licenses to the studios (Gomery, (Brown, 1995) Sought to diversify into TV and have greater access to family audience through its program 'Disneyland'
1953
Republic Republic pioneered in production for TV in 1946 (Anderson, 1994) and abandoned feature film production to devote its facilities entirely to television film in 1958 (Stuart, 1982) .
Their focus on B movies would benefit them in the TV industry
To take advantage of the production vacuum in the TV business (they saw the TV as an alternative to the studio system) and use TV as a new distribution channel.
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1986). Later that year, rather than denying the concession of a license, the FCC placed a 'freeze' on TV station licensing, suspending decisions on all pending applications (the freeze lasted until 1952). The FCC freeze helped the radio networks (CBS and NBC) secure their grip on the TV market, and by 1948, CBS was the number one player in the television market, followed by NBC and more distantly ABC. The major studios also invested in products and technologies that created theatrical audience experiences that television could not imitate. These investments led to the production of films in new widescreen processes as Cinema Scope, an increasing shift to color, huge budget costume epics, and special effects (including 3D) (Stuart, 1982) .
Disillusioned by the failure of their efforts to control the TV industry, studios became antagonistic towards the medium, and this led to a stubborn rejection to provide them content. Jack Warner stated in the early 1950s: 'the only screens which will carry Warner Bros products will be the screens of motion picture theaters the world over' (Anderson, 1994: 45) . He even went further to refuse to show a TV set in any of his motion pictures. Theater owners also lobbied studios not to supply content to television, because they reasoned that if the audience could see the stars for free in their living rooms, no one would go to the movies. The majors therefore did not release major theatrical films to television until the 1960s (Hilmes, 1990) .
Hence, in the late 1940s, most of the programs for TV were produced for live broadcast by New York-based advertising agencies.
3 In 1950, the President of NBC decided to improve the quality of programming by controlling it, ruling that advertisers would be allowed to buy only short segments of time for their commercials rather than an entire program. This decision became a norm for other networks as well. When networks decided to keep the advertisers away from producing for TV, they created a vacuum in the TV production business. Once again, note how the incumbents' actions, and their constraints, opened the door for players that were not yet (directly) involved in movie production, but had access to the key resource: creative talents.
From packaging to TV production MCA had already packaged the script, director, stars, and producer for several RKO pictures. Wasserman had seen this practice being employed in band booking by the founder of MCA, Jules Stein, and adopted the same practice in movies. Having a tight grip on the talent, MCA could now package movies and content for TV networks. In 1952, The SAG granted a blanket waiver to MCA that would permit the talent agency to take on TV production. When in 1961 SAG eventually terminated the MCA waiver, it explained to its members that the waiver had been granted to 'encourage the growth of the TV film industry and the employment opportunities of motion picture actors. At that time, in spite of the enormous economic impact of television on the theatrical box office, a large segment of the industry was determined to resist the new medium. Under the terms of the waiver, TV production increased substantially and our purpose was fully achieved' 4 (Schumach, 1961) .
Wasserman launched MCA into TV production through a newly formed subsidiary, Revue Productions, which operated a small studio acquired from Universal. Initially, MCA started to bundle its stars with mediocre performers. NBC and other networks, which needed content and could not count on much cooperation from the Studios, were happy to buy the whole package. In the end, MCA started developing complete packages (script plus talent) and shopped them to network television. Instead of earning the traditional 10% commission on the earnings of their clients, MCA would receive a packaging fee of 10% of the entire production budget. Packaging for television helped MCA leverage its roster of talents in much more profitable ways, because they could now package stars with less well-known actors and created more work opportunities for a larger number of talents. By 1959, MCA's annual gross income had grown to $58 million: $9 million from commissions, $3 million from studio rentals, and $46 million from television production and distribution (Anderson, 1994) .
Minor studios had also entered television production in the late 1940s, trying to leverage their experience in producing B movies. But given their lack of control over creative talent, they were not able to compete effectively with MCA (Table 4) . Furthermore, MCA could leverage its experience in dealing with radio broadcasters and their office in New York. Among the other talent agencies, the only competitor who could rely on similar contacts and experience was William Morris, which indeed, followed MCA's lead to start packaging products for television.
MCA was now de facto more a production company than a talent agency, and therefore the 1961 acquisition of Decca Records and its subsidiary, Universal Pictures (one of the three minor studios), only sanctioned the fact that MCA was now a Hollywood Studio. By this time, TV production was much more profitable for MCA than the talent agency business and therefore, when faced with an injunction from the Justice department in 1962 to divest Decca Records and Universal Pictures, Wasserman negotiated a deal to keep both and accepted dissolving the talent agency (Gomery, 1998) . When Wasserman dissolved the agency business and maintained the Production and Distribution business of Universal Pictures and Revue Production, many questioned how he would deal with the soaring production expenses. In June 1963, MCA agreed with NBC to produce a full season of 2-h feature films for weekly screening on NBC during the 1964-1965 season. This made-for-TV movie strategy proved highly successful. In October 1965, MCA and NBC made a $60 million film deal. The deal included 60 Universal films for network screening at about half a million dollars each: 40 for screening on the network's owned and operated stations at about a hundred thousand dollars each; an uncertain number of made-for-TV feature films for an estimated subtotal of 15 million dollars. The steady flow of TV production stemming from contracts like the one with NBC made it possible for Wasserman to organize Universal Picture productions in ways much closer to the traditional Hollywood Studio System he had helped bring down. Given the small budgets of the typical TV production, the top talents were out of reach. However, Universal built a list of young, affordable talents and started to loan them out to other studios, as Wasserman's antecedents had done at the apex of the studio system (Schumach, 1961) . Through the 1970s, the power of Universal Television was prevalent all over Hollywood. No other TV producer came close to MCA.
In the fall of 1976, Norman Lear, MCA's closest competitor, provided 4 h of shows a week on prime-time network programming, and MCA provided 14. As of 1978, MCA was still far ahead of all other major studios in network programming as shown in Table 5 .
This episode in the evolution of the industry reinforces our interpretation of the changes that led MCA to acquire a dominant position in Hollywood after the Paramount decree. Once again industry players were coping with an environmental shock (Tables 3 and 4) , and their actions shaped the emergence of a novel industry architecture, in which long-term contracts with TV broadcasters generated enough stability to bring back the vertically integrated structure of the studio system in the production, distribution, and exhibition of TV shows (Figure 1 ). Incumbents' constraints and actions, which were reasonable given the logic in which they operated, the investment they had made, and the uncertainty surrounding the emerging TV business, created a vacuum that MCA and minor studios exploited.
Two industry practices were critical in the process. Packaging was the stepping-stone MCA and other agencies later on used to enter TV production. Independent producers and minor studios interested in producing for TV and TV broadcasters looking for sources of content alternative to advertising agencies all welcomed packaging as a source of talents.
5 MCA-NBC long-term contracts broke the industry free from the uncertainty of the box-office and created the conditions for reconstructing a vertically integrated architecture. In both cases MCA pioneered the use of these practices and the industry architecture that emerged helped consolidate their strong position in the industry. Perceived the TV first as an extension of the studio system and then as a formidable competitor once it was obvious that they could not control TV. Sought to differentiate from TV by investing in alternative technologies. Since TV initially demanded cheaper programs which they were not well positioned to produce after the 1940s (due to high fixed overheads, massive administrative offices etc.), TV production came late (Stuart, 1982) Independent producers Produced extensively for TV during 1940s and 1950s
Perceived TV as an opportunity to exploit their capability to produce cheap movies, which TV required
Other talent agencies (William Morris)
Since most did not have a strong roster of talent in the beginning they were not very active in TV.
Of the larger talent agencies, William Morris due to its experience in radio was actively packaging for TV (Balio, 1985) Used their extensive experience with radio and movies and contacts with advertising agencies to move into TV business
Federal communications commission
Took actions to prevent major studios from having a stronghold in TV business (such as TV station freezes) (Hilmes, 1990) Took protective actions in favor of TV networks against major studios due to the negative public sentiment about major studios' monopolistic actions after Paramount decree Radio broadcasters Dominated TV broadcasting. Entered long-term deals to source filmed content with independent producers and MCA.
Tried to avoid advertisers agencies' live productions, reasoning that it is less risky and more profitable (due to multiple circulation) to have recorded production (such as movies and series) rather than live TV Exhibitors Lobbied studios not to produce for TV Feared losing business to TV 
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Interpretation and discussion The industry architecture perspective (Jacobides et al., 2006) , which builds on the insights of the modularity (Baldwin and Clark, 2000) and technological platforms (Gawer and Henderson, 2007) literature, suggests that architectural advantage stems from the ability to control a critical activity in the value chain to become the 'bottleneck' of the industry. Obviously, this investment ex-post appears logical and essential to the new architecture, but ex-ante is based on the acquisition of assets that will appreciate if the new architecture actually develops (Jacobides and Winter, 2007) . Jacobides et al. (2006) suggest that if (1) a particular asset stands to gain from innovation, (2) the asset is in short supply, and (3) there is a possibility to invest while they are still cheap, then it is profitable to pursue the innovation and buy the assets that will appreciate. They also argue that 'an innovator [y] may try to achieve architectural advantage by stimulating ferocious competition in the complementary assets rather than in their own segments' (Jacobides et al., 2006 (Jacobides et al., : 1214 .
Our case study provides an example of how a newcomer to the motion picture industry, the MCA, could reshape the industry architecture by (1) investing early in creative talents, before their value soared, (2) introducing novel industry practices (profit sharing, packaging, long-term TV deals) that increased the value of their investment, and (3) facilitating the growth of independent production. By themselves, these actions would not have been enough to secure an architectural advantage. Another essential factor in the emergence of this advantage, as we emphasized in the case study, were the actions (or inactions) of incumbents, channeled or constrained by regulatory and institutional rules.
There is wide consensus in the literature that incumbents struggle in adapting to technological (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Christensen and Bower, 1996; Christensen, 1997) and regulatory change (Smith and Grimm, 1987) , and that this resistance to adaptation might be partly explained by the existing institutional logic (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999 ) and the cognitive frame employed to interpret technological changes (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008; Tripsas, 2009 ). In the MCA case the decisions taken by incumbents, because of regulatory and institutional constraints, created an opportunity for entrepreneurial actors to experiment with novel practices and influenced the industry architecture in their favor.
The integrated logic that permeated the Studio System of the 1930s, together with the limitation created by the Paramount decree and the FCC actions, shaped the actions of the incumbents to open up opportunities for novel players such as MCA. Other agencies, such as William Morris, were more focused on other (more profitable) segments of the business and were not particularly interested in controlling Hollywood talent, given the widespread use of 7-year contracts in the pre-Paramount decree era. The Studios were not incompetent, but they were dealing with the rise of television following a strategic template based on an integrated logic. They tried to control TV exhibition directly, invested in technologies that would make it harder for television to compete, and shifted production to Europe to reduce costs. Their actions were consistent with the dominant institutional logic of the industry. Indeed, when TV production started to take off, it did not take most studios too many years to follow (by 1955 all the majors were also producing for TV; Table 5 ), but by then MCA had secured long-term contracts with TV networks. The integrated logic shaped the way in which studios reacted to the emerging technology (Tripsas, 2009) . Note that once Wasserman had rebuilt the integrated logic in the movie industry, he also fell prey to the same constraint and ignored or could not prevent the rise of Creative Artists Agency (CAA). This company, founded by former William Morris agents in 1975, aggressively recruited a large number of talents, brought the packaging practice back from television to the production of movies, and became the third largest agency in the industry and a dominant force in Hollywood in the 1980s. Despite the fact that Wasserman had pioneered the use of packaging to leverage his position as an agent, once at the helm of a major integrated studio (Universal) he could not stop the growth of CAA (Bruck, 2004) .
Strategists often invoke constraints to competitors' actions to explain the existence of a sustainable competitive advantage (Ghemawat, 1991 (Ghemawat, , 1993 . For instance, even though many competitors understood Dell's business model, they found it very hard to imitate without disrupting their existing operations, their asset investments and their channel relationships (Rivkin and Porter, 1999) .
6 Nevertheless in this case the trade-off did not stem only from the economics of the incumbents' strategies, but also from the set of institutional constraints in which the incumbents operated. As critical as incumbents' actions are in creating opportunities to reshape industry architecture, they would not by themselves have been enough to trigger a change in industry architecture with an architectural advantage for MCA.
Introducing novel industry practices (Lounsbury and Leblebici, 2004) such as packaging, profit-sharing, and long-term contracts was the other essential step in developing an architectural advantage for MCA. It reconfigured the web of transactions among the key players in ways that strengthened its position. These practices not only helped MCA lower the studios' bargaining power, but also helped consolidate its control on one asset that became much more valuable in the Post-Studios era ushered in by the Paramount decree. Here it is critical to stress that both profit-sharing and packaging helped created a more modular industry architecture which benefited players with investments in relationships, rather than production assets. Miller and Shamsie (1996) interpreted this shift from propertybased resources to knowledge-based resources through a resource-based lens (Barney, 1991) . They argued that the former are more critical in stable times, while the latter mattered more in times of uncertainty. Our case study is consistent with their findings, but illuminates the mechanisms that lead to architectural shifts and how one firm managed to benefit from it.
Our interpretation of the historical evidence is far from being uncontroversial, and it is important to specifically address other factors that we believe are complementary to our analysis. The first factor we need to consider is the role of Wasserman's individual characteristics. Historical accounts are consistent in stressing his charisma and negotiating skills, and it is likely that these abilities do
play a role in explaining his achievements. But many other successful agents in Hollywood were also charismatic (Selznick, William Morris, Feldman) and still were not as successful as MCA in reshaping the industry (they were still very successful as agents). Furthermore, once at the helm of Universal, Wasserman missed many important technological developments, such as the development of pay TV (HBO). He invested in unsuccessful technologies (laser disc) and never really managed to stabilize Universal's financial situation, selling it eventually in 1990 to Matsushita.
Another account of MCA' success focuses on how Jules Stein and Lew Wasserman related to politicians and union leaders. The connection with Ronald Reagan, for instance, had a clearly important role in obtaining the SAG waiver. Relationships with the union were also very good, to the extent that in 1962 the unions complained about the Department of Justice's antitrust suit against MCA. They argued that the suit would prevent MCA from making movies in Hollywood, thus reducing their members' employment opportunities. Note that both these connections were developed in the 1940s when Wasserman was a young agent with few clients (and Ronald Reagan a mediocre actor). Likewise, his relationship with the union was developed in those early years and cemented between 1966 and 1974 when Wasserman was the Chairman of the labor-negotiating arm of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA).
7 Given that these relationships were developed while Wasserman was rising to power, we should be careful in assigning them too much explanatory power. At the same time, Wasserman's political clout must not have been particularly effective given that MCA was the target of a successful Department of Justice anti-trust suit. Indeed, it was this defeat that prompted him to lead the industry in improving their lobbying presence in Washington. It was Wasserman who hired Jack Valenti, then Lyndon Johnson's personal assistant, to lead the MPAA effort in the capital.
Beyond political connections, it is fair to say that Lew Wasserman's structural position in the industry facilitated MCA's rise in the industry. As we mentioned, packaging was widespread in band-booking and Wasserman therefore merely transferred a practice his company was very familiar with. Another advantage MCA leveraged was its presence in New York, with its existing contacts through their radio business. These networks probably gave them an edge over minor studios and independent producers in the race to produce for TV. But all the large talent agencies, and especially William Morris and Famous Artists Agency, already operated in New York and in the radio business, so these ties were hardly unique to MCA.
In sum, both Wasserman's charisma and his social network and structural position played an important complementary role in enabling the changes we described. Given the single case design of this study, it is impossible for us to systematically explore the relationship between these complementary factors. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that neither Wasserman's skills nor his social networks could have been a sufficient condition for the changes in the rules and role of the motion picture industry and the rise of MCA.
Theoretical implications and concluding remarks
Conclusions from an historical case study deserve healthy caution, given the limitation of a single case study design and the multiple interpretations of historical evidence. But the case of Lew Wasserman and MCA provides interesting insights to both extend our understanding of industry evolution and identify the mechanisms that might explain whether and how a firm can build an architectural advantage.
Contributions and theoretical implications
We started from the suggestion that architectural advantage stems from becoming the bottleneck of the industry (Jacobides et al., 2006) and identified three conditions that enable newcomers to shape industry architecture to their advantage after environmental shocks: (1) the newcomer acquires control of potentially mispriced resources that stand to gain from the environmental shock, (2) industry incumbents, constrained by regulatory and institutional logics, react to the shock, and their actions create a space for newcomers, and (3) novel practices gradually substitute, complement and rewire the network of industry exchange in ways that strengthen the newcomer's central role and resources. These propositions will require further refinement and more systematic empirical testing, given the design of our study. But in terms of theoretical development, we contribute to the theory of architectural advantage in two ways.
First, we suggest that the opportunities for entrepreneurial action are essentially generated by the incumbents' attempts to cope with environmental jolts (Meyer, 1982) and maintain the old architecture by disinvesting in assets that might become valuable in the new architecture. Our contribution is consistent with findings of a study on the emergence of banking and the 'partnership system' in Renaissance Florence (Padgett and McLean, 2006) . There members of the Florentine elite, attempting to maintain their position of dominance, acted in ways that eventually opened up opportunities for fundamental changes in the political, economic and social structure of the city. Novel practices exploded. In the words of the authors: 'Florentine elites invented not because they wanted to, but because they had to, conservatively to preserve their threatened positions' (Padgett and McLean, 2006: 1473) . Like in recent studies of the British construction industry (Cacciatori and Jacobides, 2005) and mortgage banking in the United States (Jacobides, 2005) , the motion picture industry novel architecture emerges from the purposive actions of a variety of players (studios, talents, exhibitors, radio and TV broadcasters, unions, professional associations, government regulators). Our contribution extends their findings by suggesting that the dominant logic of the industry, in our case the 'integrated logic' dominant in the 1940s, together with other regulatory and institutional arrangements, limited the industry players' range of options and created opportunities for nimble players who are not constrained by the same logic. Furthermore, we specifically suggest that the actions of the incumbents might accelerate the change in architecture by selling assets that the newcomers might leverage more efficiently in the novel architecture they are building.
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Secondly, this article sheds light on the critical role played by industry practices in facilitating new patterns of collaboration (and competition) across economic actors. Designing, championing, and institutionalizing innovative industry practices, we suggest, is the path to creating architectural advantage. Through these new rules, new entrants in a specific segment of an industry can stimulate competition in its adjacent segments and consolidate their control over critical resources.
8 This control can be achieved not only through technological design choices, as the literature on modularity (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006; Fixson and Park, 2008) and platforms (Gawer and Henderson, 2007; Tee and Gawer, 2009 ) has shown, but also from more mundane contractual reconfigurations of the industry's exchanges. For instance, securitization in the US mortgage market was made possible by a series of interconnected administrative innovations (optional delivery schemes, standardization of loan characteristics, creditworthiness scores, etc.) that simplified coordination and standardized information. These practices enabled the emergence of a novel architecture in the mortgage industry (Jacobides, 2005) . Our contribution is consistent with these findings, but also suggests that the architecture enabled by the novel practices might shift profitability across segments and across industries, and thus create the basis for an architectural advantage. The practice of packaging helped MCA leverage its ability as a knowledge integrator (Brusoni et al., 2001; Di Biaggio, 2009 ) but given our research design we could not analytically separate the industry practice from the organizational capability. Future research should explore how industry practices complement firm capabilities in the process of developing architectural advantage. More broadly, our study did not elaborate on the role of capabilities in shaping the evolution of the competitive trajectories (Cacciatori and Jacobides, 2005; Jacobides and Winter, 2005; Camuffo and Zirpoli, 2009 ) and future research should explore this important relationship.
In addition to contributing to the development of a theory of architectural advantage, our findings might inform future studies in two distinct research areas. Our findings on the role of industry practices complements the studies of innovative business models in emerging industries (Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 2007; Zott and Amit, 2007) and their role in redrawing industry boundaries Eisenhardt, 2005, 2009) . At the same time our findings would suggest that business model innovation is only a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to trigger an architectural change. The acquisition of mispriced resources by newcomers and the incumbents' (in)action are also critical for newcomers to enter the industry, redraw its boundaries, and achieve an architectural advantage.
Our findings are also consistent with the insights of the literature on institutional entrepreneurship (Garud et al., 2002; Greenwood et al., 2002; Hwang and Powell, 2005; Munir and Phillips, 2005) and we suggest that developing an architectural advantage depends, among other things, on the ability to reshape the institutional fabric of a field. Future research should explore how the multiplicity of logics, practices, and roles in an industry provides opportunities for individual actors to develop an economic advantage. For instance, the overlap between different organizational fields might create opportunities to invent creative industry practices and reconfigure architecture. In the case of MCA, for instance, packaging originated in the band-booking business, in which the company had operated for years. What appears as an invention in Hollywood is essentially the adaptation of a template originating in another industry. Not only practices travel across industries, but also the presence of multiple logics within the same industry creates more opportunities for architectural change. From its beginnings the motion picture industry has always oscillated between an 'integrated logic', exemplified by the vertically integrated studio system where hierarchy is the key coordination mechanism; and a 'talent logic', in which different activities are coordinated through contractual agreements. In the latter, agents play a more central role. With the introduction of profit sharing and packaging, MCA revived and recombined an institutional chemistry that was already in the industry's DNA (Schneiberg, 2007) . Eventually when motion picture industry and TV broadcasting became more integrated, studios went back to a more integrated architecture. This structural characteristic of the motion picture industry is consistent with the observation of institutional theorists that 'multiple logics can create diversity in practice by enabling variety in cognitive orientation and contestation over which practices are appropriate. As a result, such multiplicity can create enormous ambiguity, leading to logic blending, the creation of new logics, and the continued emergence of new practice variants' (Lounsbury, 2008: 354) . At the same time, we suggest, this ambiguity creates entrepreneurial opportunities that can be leveraged to build an architectural advantage. Industries characterized by more homogeneity in logics might provide less opportunity for architectural change, because novel practices creating new patterns of exchange might be more difficult to diffuse and institutionalize.
Practical implications for strategy and policy
Given the many limitations of this study, it might be premature to extend our findings to their prescriptive implications. But a few insights from this work might help managers operating in industries with unstable, contested architectures and entrepreneurial firms trying to enter them.
Incumbent firms should carefully consider their moves in adapting to technological and regulatory change. As in the case of the 1950s movie industry, their action aimed at damage reduction might actually accommodate the new entrants and lead the industry towards a novel architecture. Their profitability might suffer. This might be, for example, the case in the music industry in the digital download era. Trying to prevent the diffusion of the novel technology in order to maintain their industry architecture, music labels might have created the space for the growth of Apple in the related digital music retailing activity. Apple tried to build an architectural advantage in the emerging digital music retailing business by (1) leveraging its dominant market share in the mp3 players market, (2) facilitating consumers' switch to the new purchasing habit by developing a userfriendly web purchase experience (Itunes), and (3) breaking away from the CD format (unbundling). Given the market share I-tunes currently enjoys in this market (70%), the labels are now trying to foster competition in the digital Entrepreneurial firms who try to develop an architectural advantage in an emerging industry could leverage our findings by asking themselves whether incumbents' reactions to environmental shocks is creating investment opportunities for them. For instance, the digital revolution in the newspaper industry is pushing leading newspapers towards outsourcing the production of content, and is therefore 'liberating' many creative talents who are now increasingly working as freelancers. Could these resources that newspapers are letting go be more profitably leveraged by entrepreneurial players under a new industry architecture?
Venture capitalists trying to identify investment opportunities might leverage our contribution on the role of the overlap between organizational fields, and focus their efforts in industries where more logics intersect, because we would expect more innovative industry practices to emerge and therefore, ceteris paribus, more opportunities to reconfigure the industry and develop an architectural advantage.
In terms of policy implications we might note that antitrust regulators, both in Europe and the United States, are increasingly showing signs of dissatisfaction with the traditional categories of market power and industry dominance, and might be interested in understanding how dominant positions based on architectural advantage might limit competition in other segments or in adjacent industries. Our contribution, by specifying the conditions that lead to the development of architectural advantage could help regulators identify specific actions that might lead companies to develop this advantage and stifle competition in the industry. For instance, antitrust authorities in the United States are obsessively monitoring Google's market share in the search-advertising market (around 75% in 2009) because their position in the search space might enable them to illegally promote their video properties (YouTube) or their web services such as online word processors and spreadsheets (Google Docs). Following our framework we might instead focus our attention on the book-scanning initiative (Google Books), which might eventually become the bottleneck of the entire publishing industry.
Concluding remarks
In conclusion, despite its limitations, we believe our study has illustrated the potential research on industry evolution holds for disciplinary cross-fertilization. Bridging sociologically rooted institutional theory with economics-based insights from the industry architecture perspective might benefit both camps. Institutional theorists could benefit from considering in detail the economic implications of the practices they have studied so effectively and also the implications of institutional changes for individual firms (a core concern for strategists). Strategists could better integrate the role of institutional logics in their theories of architectural advantage and consider how these logics affect competitive dynamics.
The idea that corporations can achieve a competitive advantage by influencing the design of the industries in which they operate is fascinating and of obvious relevance to corporate strategists and policy-makers. Developing and testing a rigorous theory of architectural advantage is no easy feat, and our attempt to explore how firms can develop it still cautious, yet a first step in the direction of understanding a novel form of competitive advantage.
Notes
1 The primary legal objection to block-booking was that it 'extends monopoly power and adds to the monopoly of a single copyrighted picture that of another copyrighted picture' (Kenney and Klein, 1983: 497) . Since 1940, the studios had already started to rely less on block-booking. After signing a consent decree to settle another Justice Department investigation on the practice, but only with the Paramount Decree, the practice was eventually banned. 2 Film financing had been at the core of the studios' activity since the emergence of the Studio System. With rising production costs and increasing box-office uncertainty, financing had become more difficult and studios could effectively leverage their size in this activity by spreading their risk over a large number of productions. Given the scope limitation of this paper, we will not discuss financing in detail, and focus on production, distribution, and exhibition. 3 Advertising agencies already dominated the production of radio programs, designed according to the needs of large advertisers such as Procter and Gamble, Texaco, or Chrysler. They translated this model to television production but the networks were increasingly unhappy about their inability to control production and scheduling and started exploring alternative sources of television production (Hilmes, 1990 ). 4 The Screen Actors Guild (SAG) had long forbidden talent agencies from producing motion pictures, because of the innate conflict of interest in concurrently being the agent and the employer. Other agencies, such as Famous Artists Agency, had been granted waiver for occasional pictures (Balio, 1985) , but no other agency had received a blanket waiver. Ronald Reagan, who was one of Wasserman's clients and a personal friend, was President of SAG at the time, and many historical accounts of this SAG decision stress the important role this friendship. 5 The fact that they needed the talents and packaging providing a solution to this problem does not mean that MCA, like any other agency, would not take advantage of controlling talent, and leverage this monopolistic position through hefty commissions, which producers and broadcasters were not happy to pay. In any case, it is a fact that packaging helped broadcasters solve
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a problem and facilitated the transition of filmed content from Hollywood to TV. 6 Another interesting similarity between MCA's disruptive strategy and Dell's, was their reliance on a 'lighter-than-air' balance sheet. In a 1962 interview with the New York Post, Lew Wasserman commented: 'To us the most important thing is manpower because that's all we really have here. We have no inventory, and our assets, we put them under our hats and night and go home' (Gelman and Aronowitz, 1962) . This is in stark contrast with the tradition brick-and-mortar studio system. The inability to react to the threat might also be based on the relative rigidity of the asset base of the Studios. 7 One version of the union connection story, very popular in the media, focuses on Lew Wasserman's friendship with Sidney Korshak, a labor lawyer often considered the mob's man in Hollywood and a very influential fixer in labor negotiations. Korshak was never indicted for any crime, but even if his mob connections were true, it is well established that he was providing his services to most studios already. MCA was not his only client, nor Wasserman his only friend in Hollywood (Thomas Jr, 1996) . 8 Jacobides and Tae (2009) 
